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CAMPAIGN PLANNING FOR A COUNTER-INSURGENCY WAR IN THE PHILIPPINES

BY

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offers the needed framework. Although the doctrinal thrust of campaign planning thus far has been that it is not appropriate for low intensity conflict, this study will seek to demonstrate that the opposite is true, that it can be used to great advantage at this end of the operational continuum. The ongoing insurgency in the Philippines will be used as a model for an American-assisted counter-insurgency campaign. The format for campaign planning developed at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College will be used to suggest the selection of operational objectives, the synchronization of the large collection of civilian and military assets that might be used in such a campaign as well as workable command relationships. Using this model, a system of planning applicable to other counter-insurgency campaigns in other environments will be suggested.

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CAMPAIGN PLANNING FOR A COUNTER-INSURGENCY WAR
IN THE PHILIPPINES

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
30 April 1990

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The United States has been involved in several counter-insurgency wars around the world since the end of World War II, most notably in Vietnam, but, in each case, has had great difficulty in marshalling all of its available forces and applying them in a coordinated fashion to achieve its national objectives. With the reduction of the Soviet conventional threat in Europe and the coincidental rise in the probability of involvement in low intensity conflicts, it is more important than ever to come to grips with how to best approach the planning of one of these complex forms of conflict. The current system of campaign planning offers the needed framework. Although the doctrinal thrust of campaign planning thus far has been that it is not appropriate for low intensity conflict, this study will seek to demonstrate that the opposite is true, that it can be used to great advantage at this end of the operational continuum. The ongoing insurgency in the Philippines will be used as a model for an American-assisted counter-insurgency campaign. The format for campaign planning developed at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College will be used to suggest the selection of operational objectives, the synchronization of the large collection of civilian and military assets that might be used in such a campaign, as well as workable command relationships. Using this model, a system of planning applicable to other counter-insurgency campaigns in other environments will be suggested.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING FOR A COUNTER-INSURGENCY WAR IN THE PHILIPPINES

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

Although American national security strategy has, since the end of World War II, been focused on Western Europe, the United States has also had enduring national commitments to other nations of special historical and geostrategic significance. Perhaps the best example of a nation with which the United States has had, and still has, a special relationship of this sort is the Republic of the Philippines. It typifies what the United States seeks for its Third World friends, a nation that has thrown off a dictatorship and opted for democracy, and what Americans fear for those same friends, the potential to regress back to authoritarianism because of poverty, insurgency, and threats from its right and its own military. On the level of global strategy, it represents a vital interest, the site of crucial American bases that constitute our forward strategic presence in Asia and the ability to protect vital sea lines of communications.

In short, the Philippines is a potential theater of operations in which American forces, primarily Special

Operations Forces (SOF) along with an odd assortment of civilian agencies, may one day go to war in the environment that has been labeled Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). In any other situation in which the Combatant Commander faces a high probability of conflict in his AOR, the deliberate planning mechanism is triggered and the CINC's theater of war campaign plan is adjusted to meet the new requirement or a subordinate theater of operations campaign plan is developed.¹ Although the strong probability of LIC in the Philippines demands careful planning, the planner encounters a yawning gap in the Joint operations planning doctrine when he attempts to apply the concepts of campaign planning to a possible LIC campaign. What the notional planner will do in the course of this study will be to plan a LIC campaign in the Philippines despite the lack of doctrine, and perhaps, in so doing, suggest a logical, doctrinal approach to LIC campaign planning. While some historical lessons learned will be used to make key points, this will not be an exhaustive treatment of lessons learned, nor will it be a detailed look at specific counter-insurgency methods, for those things have been covered in great depth in other sources. The focus of this study will be on how to use what we know about planning campaigns to fight a counter-insurgency war in the Philippines.

Before getting into the actual process of campaign planning, however, it might be helpful to briefly examine

the doctrinal shortfall. The current concept of campaign planning has done a great deal to rationalize the process of translating lofty strategic goals into manageable planning tasks in those areas easily recognized as "warfighting." However, when dealing with less easily defined elements of theater strategy, our doctrinal publications have been less helpful. One of the main areas where this problem occurs is in LIC. JCS Pub 5.0 makes the point that campaign planning has its greatest applicability in the conduct of war and military expeditions while its utility diminishes as the scale of contemplated operations and the imminence of hostilities decrease.² While LIC is not mentioned specifically, the implication is clear that in the less structured, less "military" environment of LIC, campaign planning is not appropriate or useful. But, in fact, campaign planning provides a very useful framework for planning long term Joint special operations missions like Foreign Internal Defense (FID), a SOF primary mission that has been subsumed under LIC. SOF planners need a rational campaigning process to convert theater strategic objectives into operational level tasks equally as much as conventional planners.

As is the case with many other doctrinal inconsistencies, part of the problem is the confusion of terms and what they really mean. Subsumed into the environment of LIC is the subset of counter-insurgency,

defined in JCS Pub 1-02 as those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Overlapping counter-insurgency is the concept of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), one of the five principal SOF missions, defined in JCS Pub 3-05 as those actions taken by another government to protect itself from lawlessness and insurgency.³ Both JCS Pubs 3-05 and 3-07 emphasize the fact that in LIC, which includes counter-insurgency or FID, the military plays a subordinate role to the Department of State. JCS Pub 3-07 identifies the prominent role of other government agencies as "the key difference between LIC campaign planning and war campaign planning." It also makes the point that if the Department of State cannot achieve consensus between the US and the host nation, then the campaign plan will not work, and uses this distinction as a further indication of the difference "between war and LIC." Finally, in discussing strategic objectives, JCS Pub 3-07 suggests that the Combatant Commander will focus on the enemy's main forces in war while, in LIC, the objective surrounds the issue of the legitimacy of the government, as perceived by the population, to govern.⁴

It seems that one of the main reasons that the idea of campaign planning appears inconsistent with LIC is that LIC has been defined as something other than war. The term applies to a perspective or to an environment but not to the

degree of hostilities found in war. If we can get past the term "LIC" and think of long term counter-insurgency involvement of American forces in support of a friendly nation like the Philippines, it is much less difficult to think of it as a war, a state of hostilities affecting national interests. In a counter-insurgency war, all of the elements that demand a carefully planned campaign are present, beginning with a strategic objective. Our own historical experience has taught us that successful counter-insurgency requires a solid method to identify objectives, orient on the true center of gravity, and express the commander's intent for a given space and time. A campaign plan provides a means to do those things. It also allows us to view the war in distinct, but related, phases that have different operational requirements, to specify command and control relationships, and to synchronize a bewildering collection of military and civilian agencies toward a common purpose.

While the strategic objective may indeed be the legitimacy of the government to govern or some other equally intangible objective, campaign planning facilitates the process of translating such objectives into operational tasks that are realistic and operationally achievable by the Combatant Commander or his designated subordinate. The Combatant Commander may indeed select these objectives with the cooperation or approval of the US Ambassador to the host

nation but the process is still necessary to ultimate attainment of the strategic objective. At the operational level in a counter-insurgency environment, the objectives will probably include the training of the host nation military as an effective CI force, the destruction of guerrilla units and their base areas, the interdiction of external sources of supply, and similar achievable objectives within the capability of theater SOF. Those objectives, when synchronized with other economic or informational objectives, will contribute to the success of the ultimate strategic objective.

Before getting into the actual process of campaign planning, three things must be done:

- * While a full-blown strategic estimate is beyond the scope of this study, a brief survey of the threat posed by the New People's Army, the Communist insurgency in the Philippines, as well as the right wing threat against the democratic Philippino government, is necessary to provide a rational basis for the campaign.

- * Current American efforts in the Philippines that will impact on the campaign must be briefly examined. US involvement will not start the counter-insurgency process in the Philippines. That nation has been fighting these insurgents for years. Nor will it even signify the beginning of American involvement, since various instruments

of American political and military power are being used now in support of the Philippines. The strategic environment in which the campaign will be fought, for better or for worse, has been at least partially defined by what the US has already done.

* The basic American strategic objectives for the Philippines must be identified.

THREAT ESTIMATION

A key part of the CINC's strategic estimate must be a critical examination of the threat facing the combined counter-insurgency forces in the Philippines. If we think of the threat as that against which we must direct our efforts to achieve the desired strategic end state, a unique approach is required in this counter-insurgency environment. Indeed, the word 'threat' may not be satisfactory in this case since much of the effort must be directed against the military forces of the Philippines. At the operational level, there appear to be three principal threats, all of which must be overcome to achieve our strategic objectives:

(1) The New People's Army (NPA)

Clearly, the major armed insurgency in the Philippines is the NPA. The NPA had its birth on December 26, 1968 when Jose Maria Sison and a dozen other young and

Idealistic revolutionaries met in Pangasinan at a "Congress of Reestablishment" to form a new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) after the defeat of the Hukbalahap, or Huk, movement in the 1950's. One expert describes this movement as "a distinctly Philippine version of Maoist revolutionary theory." It calls for a nationalist, rural-based, protracted people's war carried out through highly self-sufficient and very decentralized guerrilla fronts combined with widespread political mobilization.⁵ Currently, the NPA, the fighting arm of the Communist movement, consists of approximately 25,000 insurgents, active in 80% of the nation's 74 provinces.⁶ Interestingly enough, the Huk movement was defeated in the 50's by the combination of an enlightened Philippine leader, Ramon Magsaysay, and a shoestring FID operation staged by the legendary counter-insurgency expert, Edward Lansdale. Many of the lessons learned from that time are largely overlooked today, but have undisputable applicability to the situation faced by the modern Philippines.

While there are many parallels between the Huks and today's NPA, there are also important differences. For one thing, the Huk movement was based largely in the rice growing region of central Luzon, relatively close to Manila, while the NPA movement to one degree or another pervades the entire nation. However, nation-wide activity does not necessarily equate to national organization. Current

Intelligence has never been able to credit the NPA's national headquarters with effective command and control of all guerrilla bands. Indeed, many of these separate groups seem to carry the name of NPA for psychological effect while actually pursuing traditional local agendas with little or no communist flavor. Another difference is that Magsaysay faced the Huks in an economic environment of steadily rising peasant and worker incomes. The environment today is that of an economy gutted during the Marcos years. Thirdly, while the Huk movement was overwhelmingly peasant in character, the NPA is dominated by intellectuals.⁷ The distinction is important, because, as Samuel Huntington points out, peasants lose interest in violent revolutionary activity when their local and specific grievances are cured while intellectuals pursue utopian goals that governments are seldom capable of satisfying.⁸

One clear indication of the intellectual character of the insurgent movement can be seen in the turbulent doctrinal struggle going on in the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) to realign strategy to regain the ground lost after Cory Aquino's election to the Presidency. Many of the decisions that have been made have a significant impact on the character of any future counter-insurgency campaign:

* There has been a gradual shift from the Luzon cadres to the "Mindanao faction" who favors a more violent and aggressive approach.

* The decision has been made to procure more lethal and more versatile weapons from abroad.

* Economic sabotage will be stepped up.

* Urban partisan units will be strengthened and the urban offensive accelerated. Targets may be less specific and may now include an open season on all counter-revolutionary enemies. Along with this came the unprecedented decision to target Americans.⁹

* CPP leaders want the NPA to step up the armed struggle to the next "strategic stalemate" and move from pure guerrilla tactics to "tactical offensives" with battalion-size units.¹⁰

With the information available, it is difficult to say how soon the NPA guerrillas can achieve the ambitious goals of their political masters in the CPP. It is probable that critical logistics problems threaten that sort of growth for the moment. Intelligence indicates that the NPA only has enough modern small arms to equip a third of its force. Lack of enough food to sustain large units is also a problem. Recently, in Negros, the NPA reduced the size and

presence of their forces because they were overstaying their welcome in an area already short of food. Most of their finances come from extorting money from business enterprises in the stronger economic areas, mostly multi-national corporations who wish to continue doing business in the area, but they may have reached the limit of what can be taken in this way.¹¹

The move to obtain heavier weapons, like mortars, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft weapons represents an escalation in previous NPA effectiveness. There are indications that North Korea may have already agreed to help the NPA obtain these weapons, but the necessity for seaborne delivery still makes the whole enterprise vulnerable to interdiction. There is also information that the NPA has scheduled training for some personnel in the use of SAM-7 and RPG-7 weapons at a training site in upper Luzon.¹² All of this represents a qualitative change in the threat but one that is highly vulnerable to the cutting of shaky supply lines.

One of the more disturbing trends has been the strengthening of an urban underground in Manila and a few of the other large cities whose principal mission appears to be high value assassinations. Beginning in the past three years, the NPA has organized small, but very dangerous, urban guerrilla groups like the Alec Boncayo Brigade (ABB). The ABB, in all likelihood, was responsible for the

assassination of Jaime Ferrer in August of 1987, the first cabinet level assassination in Philippine history. More significant to US involvement, the ABB executed a well planned operation in April of 1989 that resulted in the death of Colonel James N. Rowe, a Special Forces officer assigned to the Joint US Military Advisory Group - Philippines (JUSMAGPHIL). A senior NPA cadre, Celso Minguez, later explained that the target was carefully chosen for its symbolic value; Colonel Rowe, a well known American Vietnam veteran, was selected to emphasize the similarity between US involvement in Vietnam and its current involvement in the Philippines. By killing him, the NPA was successful in reopening debate in the press about US activities in the Philippines.¹³ In conducting operations of this kind successfully, the NPA is capable of accomplishing the strategic objective of undermining US support for the Philippines. In fact, the NPA decision to intensify its urban struggle will probably result in an increase in ABB strength to about 300. Probably as a result of this new strategy, Americans were warned in October of 1989 that any American involved in the "total war concept," the NPA term for counter-insurgency, would be targeted by groups like the ABB.¹⁴

One final item about the NPA that deserves mention is the phenomenon that has been referred to in its Central American context as "liberation theology." There are a

number of Catholic priests who are directly involved in the insurgency to the point of taking up arms and fighting as guerrillas.¹⁵ In Central America, militant priests have provided a great deal of ideological fervor to the Communist movement, but it remains to be seen what effect the Philippine version will have. But the Philippines are a deeply religious people and the direct involvement of priests in the fighting must be taken seriously.

(2) Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

The MNLF is a Moslem-based separatist movement that has operated in the southern Philippines in one form or another for almost a century. This threat was reduced considerably in the 1970's by skillful political maneuvering by Ferdinand Marcos. He succeeded by coopting Moslem leaders and granting partial autonomy to the largely Moslem provinces and providing developmental aid.¹⁶ Up until that time, the MNLF, under the leadership of Nur Misuari, a Tausug Moslem and graduate in Asian Studies from the University of the Philippines, had carried on a bloody rebellion resulting in thousands of casualties.¹⁷ The guerrilla wing of the MNLF is the Bangsa Moro Army, numbering approximately 15,000 fighting men.¹⁸ Operating in the same area as the MNLF are the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro Islamic Reformist Group (MIRG), two breakaway groups. Of less significance than the MNLF,

they are, nonetheless, a military threat to any FID campaign in their areas. The MILF has approximately 2900 fighters and the MIRG has around 900.¹⁹

Although these groups have been threats in the past, they are currently quiet, and will not be considered further in this study.

(4) New Armed Forces of the Philippines (NAFP)

Known as simply the AFP during the Marcos era, Fidel Ramos attached the word 'new' to signify that the Philippine armed forces would no longer be the old, corrupt, nepotistic Army of the past, but one that would support and defend its democratically elected government. Soon after, soldiers of the American 1st Special Forces Group started to see the Philippine flag prominently displayed on the shoulders of Philippine army uniforms, obviously a symbol of the new way of thinking. One of the tragedies of the post-Marcos Aquino period has been the failure of the professional military of the Philippines to continue this hopeful trend. Instead, it has exhibited a virulent politicization and an addiction to the quick gratification of the coup that not only threaten the stability of the democratic Aquino government but undermine its own ability to successfully deal with the NPA insurgency.

Most of the AFP's problems can be traced to the abuses and neglect of the Marcos years. During those years, the

AFP became, for the most part, a praetorian guard, with loyalty to Marcos, rather than merit, being the basis for promotion. The AFP's roots were in the Philippine Constabulary, uniformed soldiers who had always been hopelessly entangled in the political world and for whom the distinction between the political and the military had never meant what it does to an American soldier. During the Marcos years, the AFP was often required to take on civilian duties and political posts. By the time Aquino came on the scene, the line between military duty and improper political involvement had become hopelessly blurred. Marcos further prostituted the military by favoring his home province of Ilocos Norte when promotions were made, a habit that encouraged the professional soldier to seek patrons in the halls of political power.²⁰

Some of the better units that could boast distinguished service against the Hukb deterlorated and, in some cases, became as great a threat to the Philippino citizen as the NPA. One of the best examples of this particular evil was the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF), a government sponsored home malitia formed to provide local security at the village level. Ignored by the senior Army leadership of the Marcos era, they were ill-trained and ill-equipped. Often, they threw down their weapons and ran when confronted by the NPA and thus became a major source of weapons and ammunition for the guerrillas. Worst of all for the counter-insurgency

effort, they were a major source of human rights abuses against their own people. The Asia 1986 Yearbook contrasted the "exceptionally disciplined NPA" with government-armed forces "involved in kidnappings, torture, 'salvaging', intimidation of the rural population and frequent drunken binges at night with indiscriminate firing."²¹ Despite overtures from American SOF personnel to involve them in combined training exercises, they were treated by the AFP as a source of embarrassment and kept well in the background, doing the counter-insurgency effort for which they were designed far more harm than good.

Ironically, the Reform the Army Movement (RAM), which has figured so prominently in the anti-Aquino coups of the past four years, was a response by idealistic younger officers in the AFP to these abuses. In fact, RAM, under the leadership of charismatic Gregorio Honasan, was a key element in Aquino's displacement of Marcos in 1986. Sources close to RAM maintain that it was a group of 1978-81 graduates of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), because of the crime and corruption that they had witnessed in the AFP, who formed the reform movement. They needed to involve more senior officers and this led them to an alliance with Honasan, a 1971 graduate, and several other officers of his generation.²² In fact, the PMA appears to figure prominently in the radicalization of these RAM officers. One author feels that the traditional ideological education

at the PMA was gradually debased with the curriculum including courses on Marcos' ghost-written books, his paid academics' theorizations on "constitutional authoritarianism", and the teachings of another former instructor, who later defected to the NPA, on so-called "Filipino Ideology."²³ In short, the PMA, the West Point of the Philippines, has not inculcated democratic ideals into its cadets as our own West Point does for our professional officers, but has contributed to an unfortunate tendency to trust in authoritarian approaches. The officers who have led the recent coups, despite their public statements, are not democrats at heart, but are the members of an entire generation of young officers radicalized by RAM. It could well be that they represent a faction in the military unwilling to give up the privileges of the Marcos era.

More disquieting still is the depth to which this radicalization may have penetrated. In the 1987 coup, it appeared that many of the more disciplined units refused to participate. That coup was staged from the Philippine Army Training Center (PATC) at Ft. Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija province near the city of Cabanatuan. Based on information that surfaced after the coup, it is probable that many of the soldiers who marched to Manila were in training at the PATC at the time and had no real idea that they were marching in support of a coup. Prominent in the 1989 coup, on the other hand, were units of the Philippine Marines and

the Scout Rangers, some of the best to be found in the AFP. The 2000 man coup force was formed around the Ft. Bonifacio based 4th Marine Brigade and the 1st Scout Ranger Battalion. The Scout Rangers were formed in the 1950's by Rafael Iileto to carry out effective small unit operations against the Huks and the Marines have been very effective against the NPA. The presence in the rebel ranks of former Air Force general Jose Zumel was also an indication that Honasan and RAM had found support among prominent former Marcos supporters.²⁴

An analysis of the effectiveness of the AFP as a counter-insurgency instrument today would have to take note of all of these flaws. We must recognize that significant numbers of its officers are not responsive to the democratic government, but rather, believe that only they have the strength and the resolve to defeat the insurgency. They are deeply suspicious of President Aquino's often articulated belief that the insurgency can be defeated peacefully.

More disquieting still, there is growing doubt that Cory Aquino can effectively deal with her rebellious military officers. A deeply disturbing symptom of the rot was the resignation of Rafael Iileto as Defense Secretary in January of 1988. His resignation signalled a serious setback for his brand of depoliticized professionalism in the AFP. To many, he symbolized that US-bequeathed ideal. He believed in "back to basics" for the military and

espoused many of the same techniques that had resulted in the defeat of the Huks. But he lost out in the political battles being fought for power and influence over the military.²⁵

As a matter of policy, the US has identified itself with right wing factions of this type in the past to achieve the short term defeat of an insurgency inimical to American interests. The long term effects, however, have usually been undesirable. Therefore, it is important to view the right-wing anti-democratic forces within the NAFF as a threat no less dangerous than the NPA itself. The victory of either will bring about an end state that threatens democracy in the Philippines. In strategic terms, no less so than the NPA, the Philippine Armed Forces are an important center of gravity in any counter-insurgency or nation-building effort.

CURRENT AMERICAN EFFORTS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The American involvement in the Philippines over the past decade has involved, to one degree or another, all of the instruments that must be integrated into a national level campaign for the Philippines. While the AFP has carried on its counter-insurgency war with the NPA, the principal threat to Philippine national security, the United States has simultaneously carried on a series of military

and political activities in the Philippines which were, for the most part, unrelated to the Philippine counter-insurgency effort and very often unrelated to one another. There has been no conceptual link among current American peacetime activities, the possible combined US-Philippine counter-insurgency effort in the near future, or the role of these same forces in a future general war in the Pacific. Today's efforts are not conceived as operations on the low end of the operational continuum that might flow along the continuum into a wider involvement in the same theater in the future.

Because the campaign plan in this study will seek to integrate American operational activity in the Philippines throughout the operational continuum, it is important to understand what the US is doing now in the Philippines. The starting point of the campaign will be defined by what the US has already done in the country prior to making the political commitment to become more deeply involved in the insurgency. For the most part, those activities have been exercises and combined training between Philippines and American SOF and a security assistance program administered by JUSMAGPHIL.

Although there is a relatively long history of SOF operations in this part of the world, the current phase began in 1984 with the reactivation of the Asia-oriented 1st Special Forces Group. Under the overall direction of

CINCPAC and CG, WESTCOM, units of the 1st Special Forces Group have operated in the Philippines since 1984, accomplishing outstanding combined training successes with the AFP in the BALIKATAN and BADGE PACK series of exercises. BALIKATAN, from a Tagalog word meaning 'shoulder to shoulder,' has ostensibly been meant to exercise treaty obligations specified in the American-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 under which the US comes to the assistance of the Philippines in answer to an external invasion by a third power. According to the American interpretation of the Treaty, there are no counter-insurgency provisions written into it. The Badge Pack series have been conducted to support the WestCom Commander's Expanded Relations Program (ERP), with the stated goal of increasing military to military relationships between American officers and the professional military of the Pacific basin. To achieve these goals, combined training between American and Philippine units has been permitted to take almost any direction and has most often been planned at unit level.

It's important to note that none of these operations were designed to support any sort of country level campaign plan to defeat the NPA insurgency, which the Philippines view as the most real and most immediate threat that they face. The principal training activity in all of these exercises has been combined training between US and

Philippino units. American SOF has exercised its FID capability by providing training to Philippino Infantry and special operations units. But Philippino units have been trained without any sort of American planning focus on where and how they would later be employed in the overall counter-insurgency effort against the NPA. In fact, American officers planning SOF activities in the Philippines have had to tread very lightly to avoid any overt appearance that the US was involved in the counter-insurgency war against the NPA. This has been in answer to public threats made by the NPA against American civilians, principally dependents of American military personnel, living in the Philippines. In the final analysis, these threats may be the most substantial reason why American strategy has never been realistically formulated to answer the threat in the Philippines.

While American SOF has been carried out on a regular basis since 1984, so has the instrument of security assistance, but on a totally separate track. Security assistance in the Philippines appears to offer an example of security assistance being used as a stand-alone instrument. While a great deal of the equipment transferred to the Philippines has been used by the AFP in its counter-insurgency war against the NPA, security assistance by itself has not provided the United States an effective lever to influence the efficiency or the behavior of the

AFP. In all likelihood, this is because the Philippines see the security assistance program as a quid pro quo for continued use of the American bases, not as an effort to help them defeat their enemies. Officers of JUSMAGPHIL confess to feeling much the same way. Because the equipment transferred to the AFP is seen by its American handlers more as "rent" than as a means to increase the efficiency of the AFP to fight the insurgents, there is no design behind what it is and where it goes. Security Assistance expert Gabriel Marcella points out that proponents of these programs often fail to distinguish between access and influence, preferring the latter when the operational reality is often only access. And access offers no guarantee of influence, only the illusion of influence.²⁶ The interposition of the bases issue almost guarantees that our security assistance program will not provide us any influence in any other area of the US-Philippino relationship.

Aside from the bases issue, the point can be made that equipment that is transferred without attention to the human dimension accomplishes only a fraction of its potential. The inventory of AFP warfighting equipment shows, that with few exceptions (British Scorpion light tanks, for example), most of it is American equipment.²⁷ But American Special Forces working with Philippine Infantry units have often discovered that the soldiers using the equipment never received the training that an American soldier using the

same equipment would receive. Mortar crews, for example, cannot operate a fire direction center or lack the basic skills of mortar gunnery. They also have found that a great deal of the equipment is so poorly maintained that it is unusable, and that some of it has been sold off, either to private armies or, worse still, to the NPA. The principal reason for the poor maintenance is that AFP soldiers are expected to provide their cleaning equipment out of their own pockets and they are simply too poor to do so. Soldier skills are lacking because of the glaring deficiencies in the Philippine Army Training Center at Ft. Magsaysay. The PATC is not manned or equipped to provide the training. Soldiers sell their equipment because of poverty, certainly, but more to the point, because leadership is poor at the NCO and company grade officer level. The sum of these deficiencies is a generally poor capability at the small unit level, the level at which truly effective counter-insurgency is carried out.

The point to be made is not the low efficiency of the AFP at the small unit level although that is certainly true. The issue is that security assistance that provides equipment alone without a coordinated program that concentrates on the human dimension is aimless and does nothing to influence the direction and the capability of the Philippine Armed Forces or its ability to defeat the NPA. This is security assistance practiced at the local, or

tactical, level, with no operational or country-wide perspective. In fact, the lack of coordination has been so complete that American SOF units working in the Philippines who could provide the training to go with the equipment have often stumbled upon American security assistance programs of which they had no prior knowledge.

These same American SOF units have also discovered a tendency in the AFP to devote much of the resources that have come to them in the form of security assistance to specialized units at the expense of their infantry units. This has often resulted in more prestige than capability. Completely left out of the security assistance picture are units like the Citizen Armed Force Geographic Units that are actually closer to the counter-insurgency war than anyone else. No mechanism exists to prioritize security assistance according to a national plan to fight the insurgents or to coordinate it with SOF training assets readily at hand.

Finally, the strategic environment in which campaign planning will take place is greatly influenced by the difficult sovereignty issue of the American bases. The US bases in the Philippines have a complex historical relationship with the counter-insurgency effort. In the 1950's, they were often employed to the mutual benefit of the two countries, as a base for US forces like the 7th Fleet as well as a base for fighting the Huks. But for the past thirty years, Americans have seen their role in

geo-strategic terms, critical to American global efforts to contain the Soviets. While he was CINCPAC, Admiral John S. McCain testified to Congress that the bases bore a direct relationship to the very survival of the United States as a free and independent nation. They were essential to the control of vital sea lanes and the peace and stability of Southeast Asia.²⁸ Admiral McCain's description of the general American attitude about the bases is as true today as it was then. Above all, they are seen by American policy-makers as a key element in maintaining the US deterrent posture in Asia and in pursuing US interests in the region.

The difficulty arises when American ethnocentric attitudes about the bases are compared to the views of Philippino nationalists. To many Philippino nationalists, the bases are an example of the colonial system of extraterritoriality and are thus an affront to Philippino sovereignty. For our purposes, we can also say that these bases do nothing to help the Philippines defeat their principal threat, the New People's Army. While the bases don't contribute to the counter-insurgency effort, it is not difficult for Philippines who are fighting the NPA to see the vast military potential of the bases in the CI effort. Philippino officers, in moments of confidence over the past several years, have often commented to American friends that

the bases could make an immense contribution to the war against the NPA if the Americans permitted them to do so.

That American national policy discourages any use of the bases to aid the Philippines in the counter-insurgency war is only part of the problem. A vast American community has grown up in the areas around Clark Air Base and Subic Bay and American housing areas have been built in the local Philippine neighborhoods. Because these areas are also the traditional home provinces of the Hukb and the NPA, the lives of American wives and children are hostage to the continued 'good will' of the insurgents. This is an advantage that the NPA has not hesitated to exploit in recent years. Periodically, the NPA has made public threats that American civilians would be targeted if the US ever became actively involved in the counter-insurgency effort and they punctuated this threat in 1987 by killing two Americans in an Angeles City restaurant parking lot not four hundred yards from the gate to Clark Air Base. Because these civilians cannot be protected in any real sense, rational decision-making about using the bases for counter-insurgency has been impossible for those close to the problem.

Another unfortunate side effect of this threat has been the tremendous difficulty each US service has had in dealing jointly with one another in the Philippines on the Philippine insurgency problem. Undeniably, the US Air Force

and the US Navy have operated their bases and housed their civilians peacefully because the NPA has chosen for its own reasons not to interfere. With the reintroduction of US Army Special Forces into the theater in 1984 and the increase in combined training with the AFP, the bases problem took on a new dimension. Army Special Forces officers have encountered a surprising level of hostility from their Air Force counterparts based in the Philippines. If anything, the resulting refusal to support US Army-AFP combined training has further exposed to Philippino observers the American attitude that the bases are there to serve US interests only.

CHAPTER II - PLANNING THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN

As the Combatant Commander for the Pacific theater of war, CINCPAC has developed a theater of war campaign plan, which he refers to as his 'warfighting strategy.' That theater campaign plan contains his strategic vision and intent for warfighting in the Pacific theater, of which the Philippines and contiguous waters are a part. The CINC's theater strategy for the Philippines would be derived through the Joint Strategic Planning System and would reflect national security objectives. As an example, in the last published National Security Strategy, the President stated that we as a nation are determined to help the Philippines, an important Pacific ally, to overcome the challenges it faces so that it can sustain economic growth, counter the threat of a virulent Communist insurgency, and strengthen democratic government.²⁹ This goal is repeated in the report of the Secretary of Defense to Congress.³⁰

However, before CINCPAC translates national security objectives into his theater strategy, a truly combined effort between American and Philippine political and military leaders must take place to identify strategic objectives for the campaign agreed upon by both nations. A combined campaign cannot even begin with a strategy mismatch between the two nations, a seemingly obvious statement, but one that was certainly ignored by the leaders of the United States and Vietnam in the early 1960's, and probably again between the US and Lebanon in the early 1980's. With total

agreement on strategic objectives for a counter-insurgency campaign in the Philippines, true campaign planning can begin. This notional campaign will "operationalize" the following strategic objectives:

- * Ensure that the Republic of the Philippines remains stable, economically viable, democratic, and friendly to US national interests.

- * Retain a forward American presence in Asia and maintain a healthy partnership with the democratic nations of the region.

- * As the Soviet presence in Europe changes in character, contain any long term Soviet strategy to expand in the Pacific.

The campaign for a combined American-Philippino effort to defeat the NPA insurgency in the Philippines will adhere to the campaign tenets provided by a Strategic Studies Institute study by William W. Mendel and Floyd T. Banks.³¹ Specifically, those tenets are:

- * Provides broad concepts of operations and sustainment to achieve the above strategic objectives in the subordinate theater of operations. Designating this subordinate theater must be one of the early planning decisions. That theater of operations should include the

entire Philippines archipelago and all contiguous waters (in the southwest extending as far toward Sabah as the territorial limit claimed by Malaysia).

* Provides an orderly way to make strategic military decisions - displays the commander's vision and intent. Because of the tendency of a counter-insurgency campaign to be open-ended, it is critical that the commander define at this point what constitutes success, the end state that will result in the withdrawal of American forces. We can't forget that the US has had a spotty record in counter-insurgency because of poorly understood objectives.

* Orients on the enemy's center of gravity. Because the ability of government forces to retain the loyalty of the population is at least the equal in importance as defeating the enemy in the field, our own center of gravity, what the insurgents need to attack, must be understood and protected.

* Phases a series of related major operations. Bearing in mind that these operations can be both political as well as military in character and be affected by different American and Philippine public laws, phases will help the commander define his statutory responsibilities as well as campaign objectives at different points. Phases will also help define the extent and the character of direct

American involvement as the campaign progresses. The first phase will be in far greater detail than subsequent phases because the strategic environment in a counter-insurgency theater of operations is very dynamic and less predictable than a more conventional operation. But dynamic though it may be, phasing provides a conceptual methodology to understand what is required to move into a new level of American political and military involvement without, at the same time, increasing the investment in resources. It also eliminates the serious disconnect in current war planning between what SOF does on different parts of the operational continuum.

* Composes subordinate forces and designates command relationships. A campaign plan will allow for the composition of a complex, inter-agency task force and establish its relationship with its Philippine counterparts. It will establish the command relationships that must prevail between CINCPAC, his Joint Task Force commander in the Philippines, the Ambassador, and several civilian and military agencies, not normally accustomed to working in harness with other agencies. The ability to do this and to stay with it through the entire campaign may be the real foundation for ultimate success.

* Provides tasks and operational direction to subordinates. Subordinates will include tangible and

readily identifiable entities like Special Operations Forces, in-country Central Intelligence Agency assets, Air Force and Navy components, and possibly US Coast Guard. It will also include small, specialized detachments, sometimes consisting of no more than one man, in places like the Philippine Military Academy, the Philippines Staff College, or the headquarters of the National Police. Finally, the commander must be able to task activities like security assistance and the CINC and JCS directed exercise program. As we have already seen, in the pre-conflict theater that exists today in the Philippines, each of these activities operates quite separately, responsive to its own chain of command or source of funding, and, at times, in direct competition with one another.

* Synchronizes all military and civilian assets into a cohesive and synergistic whole by viewing the country-wide counter-insurgency effort at the operational level of war. One of the great advantages of applying the tenets of campaign planning will be to coordinate military and civilian assets that have never been coordinated thereby eliminating the infuriating inter-agency and inter-service competition that goes on in the Philippines today.

Concept of Operations and Sustainment

During the process of "strategic integration," the CINC must select operational level objectives that are realistic and operationally achievable by the military forces and civilian agencies that will operate as part of the JTF in the Philippines. This strategic integration must be done with the cooperation of the Ambassador and both the Ambassador and the government of the Philippines must approve of the objectives.³² Because everything in this environment will have political significance, the forum for talks with the Philippines should be carefully chosen. Possibly the best forum is the Mutual Defense Board (MDB), a headquarters manned by both Americans and Philippines, based at Ft. Bonifacio in Manila. Currently, its function is to administer the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, the real basis for the US-Philippino defense relationship. For years, the Treaty has been interpreted, on the American side, as requiring the US to come to Philippino aid only in the case of an external threat, not to aid the Philippines in an insurgency situation. Were the function of the MDB to be realigned to address the actual threat against the Philippines, the NPA insurgency, its presence would have a far more rational justification in Philippino eyes than it does now.

To achieve the critical consensus on operational level objectives, the American commander must understand that there is a strong body of opinion in the Philippines that

believes that the US is only in the Philippines to serve its own global interests, not to do anything for the Philippines. From these early meetings, a consensus must emerge that the US is in the Philippines to help the Philippines defeat the insurgents and to strengthen their democracy, and that a return to authoritarianism will threaten future US involvement and perhaps end it altogether. Consensus will also depend on the American ability to communicate some fundamental changes in attitudes about the role of American bases in the Philippines.

The operational objectives will include the tangible and the less tangible but they will be objectives that are achievable at the level below the theater of war. The final consensus on operational objectives for the campaign should probably include the following:

- * Train the Armed Forces of the Philippines to be an effective counter-insurgency force, capable of carrying on joint counter-insurgency operations that will result in the elimination of the New People's Army as a threat to the national security of the Philippines.

- * Develop a total intelligence capability in the Philippines that combines intelligence collection and covert operations that can be effectively and efficiently integrated into the counter-insurgency campaign.

* Eliminate the NPA, the armed wing of the insurgency, as an effective fighting force.

* Carry out strategic and operational psychological operations that destroys the legitimacy of the insurgency and promotes democracy and loyalty to the government of the Philippines.

* Assist the AFP in writing new curriculums for its system of military schools that emphasizes effective command and staff operations and further emphasizes the responsiveness of the military to the democratically elected government.

* Train the AFP to carry out effective interdiction operations that shut off outside sources of supply to the insurgents.

* Carry out civic action programs that are responsive to the needs of the people in insurgent-dominated areas.

* Develop in the AFP an effective system of command and control to run the counter-insurgency war.

* Integrate the security assistance program into the total counter-insurgency effort.

* Integrate the peacetime exercise program into the total counter-insurgency effort.

* Develop an effective police force capable of eliminating the urban underground threat.

Commander's Vision and Intent

One of the many lessons that must be taken out of our Vietnam experience is that it is easy to lose sight of the strategic direction of the campaign along the way because, in any long term commitment, war aims can change many times. Political pressures, both domestic and international, ebb and flow tempting decision makers to redefine the definition of success. Our policy in Vietnam ranged from advice and assistance, to large scale conventional involvement, to the Americanization of the war, then back to Vietnamization. At the end, disengagement with some semblance of a reputation still intact had become the desired end state of the campaign. More often than not, conditions external to the threat in Vietnam drove these changes in goals.

Because a counter-insurgency campaign does have the potential to become open-ended if it is allowed to do so, it is crucial that the CINC provide his vision and intent at the beginning. As with operational objectives, this vision will include recognizable and tangible military goals but will also include a less tangible dimension. The important point is that the CINC, based on the national security strategy, the threat, and his study of our historical

experience, must provide a vision that projects our involvement in the Philippines out to a logical conclusion. It should set a reasonable and acceptable limit on the depth of American involvement and should identify, as clearly as possible, a goal or a point in time that defines either success or the conditions that will end US involvement. Because there is a dominating human dimension to counter-insurgency, his vision should establish the guiding spirit of the American involvement and set the course by laying out the intangible ideals that must guide our effort. Vision and intent might appear as follows:

* American involvement must be consistent with American democratic values. In describing his approach to his years of effort in the Philippines during the Huk insurgency, Edward Lansdale said, "You should know one thing at the beginning: I took my American beliefs with me into these Asian struggles, as Tom Paine would have done."³³ Lansdale knew and valued the principles written into our Constitution and Bill of Rights and let them guide him in his dealings with the Filipino people.

* We must deal with this insurgency in the Philippines on its own terms, not as a surrogate for Soviet expansion, and approach it as a conflict with its own distinctively national roots, driven by its own peculiar history. Indeed, this is an example of how counter-balancing the Soviets in

the Third World, as we have sought to do since the advent of "wars of national liberation," will have less relevance in the decade ahead.

* Initial American participation will focus on PSYOPS, the training of the AFP, and the development of a better total intelligence capability. Americans will not participate in combat operations until it is clear that no other course is open. Throughout our efforts to train the AFP, however, we must be mentally prepared to escalate to direct combat involvement and our preparation to do so must proceed in step with our training efforts.

* Success, in American terms, will be achieved when the Philippines have demonstrated a reasonable capability to carry out effective counter-insurgency on their own and are making progress in defeating the insurgency. Success is complete if this can be achieved before any Americans ever become directly involved in combat. At this point, US activities in the Philippines should return to today's levels with, hopefully, more coordination between the various instruments than exists today.

* The Philippines will remain an economy of force theater. Our involvement must not call for any more resources than we currently invest in our peacetime competition efforts. Both we and the Philippines face times

of tightening resources so this war must be fought with what we now have on hand. The American effort cannot reach a level that excites hostile public or congressional attention. For that reason, maximum advantage must be taken of the force multiplier dimension of American SOF. SOF will remain the force of choice and no course of action calling for a significant infusion of conventional forces will be considered. Our efforts must still be effective. If we cannot apply a great amount of resources to this conflict, then what we do apply must be the best that is available to us.

* American involvement, no matter what level it does reach, must always remain unobtrusive. This is a Philippine war fought against the enemies of the Philippine people, and their military must be seen by their people as being responsible for any and all successes that are achieved. Too much credit to the American side will generate resentment that will undo the good that the US can accomplish.

* Media coverage, both American and Philippine, must be expected and dealt with realistically. Modern technology allows the world press to report events worldwide in near real time, so often events will receive massive world coverage, complete with editorialization, before decision makers can react to them. American public opinion will

continue to be intolerant of a significant and expensive US involvement in areas where US interests are not directly threatened. That means that everything that the US does in the Philippines, no matter how insignificant that it may seem at the time, will have a dominant political dimension. A single instance of American wrongdoing in such an environment can have the same strategic result as a lost battle.

* Our total effort must be fairly applied and be guided by the strategic goal. The US must not allow its assistance to be prostituted to selfish or politically immoral ends on the domestic political level. It cannot be allowed to favor single ethnic or religious groups, or to support the expansion of the domestic power base of local politicians.

* There can be no excess baggage or hidden agendas. The ultimate objectives of the campaign cannot be subordinated to lesser motives like dividing the pie up between the various services or allowing the security assistance effort to be diverted to the profits of American businesses back home.

* We must cover our rear on the issue of the American bases. As we are currently disposed, our dependent families are hostages to effective counter-insurgency operations in

the Philippines and will be attacked at the first indication that US assistance is hurting the insurgents. The evacuation of American families will be the surest possible indicator of US resolve to do what has to be done to defeat the insurgents. Realistically, this evacuation is inevitable, given the public statements already made by the CPP, through their voice in the National Democratic Front. At this point, the bases should begin to be freely used in the counter-insurgency effort, as training bases as well as bases for military forces fighting the NPA. It is very possible that a change in the public role of these bases from a visible symbol of American extraterritoriality to one of a significant counter-insurgency asset will allow the US to continue to use them in a less offensive way to serve American global interests.

Enemy and Friendly Centers of Gravity

To provide a focus for the campaign, the enemy center of gravity to be attacked and the friendly center of gravity to be protected must be identified. Clausewitz saw the center of gravity as the "hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends."³⁴ That is no less true in a counter-insurgency environment like the Philippines than it is in conventional war in central Europe, but will probably be more difficult to recognize in the unstructured LIC

environment. At the highest level of strategy, in an intensely political environment of this kind, the center of gravity will unquestionably be more an abstract political ideal and less a solid, readily identifiable entity. As is true with insurgencies the world over, the will and loyalties of the population must be considered the center of gravity at the level of national strategy. It is for that reason that the Aquino administration must aggressively pursue the twin goals of economic development and land reform, issues that have been at the root of most Philippine discontent in the countryside, or the bundok, to use the Tagalog word, since the time of the Spanish. The NPA movement of today, as well as the Sakdalista peasant rebellion of the 1930's and the Hukbalahap insurgency of the 1950's, were fundamentally about peasant rights with land reform at the core.³⁵

But while this may be the fundamental cause of the NPA insurgency's success and must be attacked at the national level, it cannot be thought of as the center of gravity at the operational level. To identify theater strategic goals, CINCPAC and his subordinate theater of operations commander must think at a level below that at which issues like land reform are pursued. To begin that process, a look back at some of the basic causes for the defeat of the Huks, what their center of gravity might have been, might help clarify the modern picture. Edward Lansdale made the case that the

back of the Huk rebellion was broken in the last months of 1951 although the struggle went on for some time after that. He believed that to be true because the Philippine military succeeded at about that time in truly wedding itself with the people, in becoming their Army, leaving the Huks outside the "national family" of the Philippine nation.³⁶ Another fascinating assessment of the causes for Huk defeat is provided by William Pomeroy, an American radical who fought with the Huks. Writing in a Philippine prison later, among other reasons, he sees at the root of their problems the growing willingness of the people to help the Philippine military. By the end of 1951, he believed that the Huks had lost the strategic initiative, what insurgents cannot afford to lose above all else, and were back on the defensive where they had been at the very beginning.³⁷

The willingness of the people to support, or at least to tolerate, the presence of guerrillas has always been crucial in insurgencies, but the peculiar environment of the Philippines makes it especially so. In a speech at the Special Warfare Center at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina in 1964, Napoleon Valeriano, a Philippine officer who had been prominent in the anti-Huk campaign, identified some of these peculiarities and how they had contributed to the defeat of the Huks. He pointed out that the Philippines were 7,000 islands, with only 364 inhabited, and that the physical separation from the mainland had prevented massive external

aid from the Chinese Communists. He also pointed out that in the eight years of the campaign, the Philippines had never had to deal with the problem of sanctuary as the US had to in Vietnam.³⁸

All of this points to several truths about the center of gravity. The center of gravity is not an external power that provides ideological and material support to the insurgency. The NPA today, like the Huks before them, is largely a home-grown insurgency dependent upon internal resources to maintain itself. Under those circumstances, an internal command structure that provides ideological direction and logistical coordination might be suggested as the center of gravity. That was certainly true of the Huks, as the American Huk, Pomeroy, reveals when he relates the shattering impact on the movement of the capture of the entire Huk Secretariat in late 1950. This capture gave the Philippine counter-insurgency forces the entire tactical plan of action and the organization of the Huk movement.³⁹ On this point, however, there is a significant difference between the Huks and the NPA. While the Huks were restricted to the rice-growing region of central Luzon, the NPA is scattered out over the entire archipelago. The environment forces tremendous decentralization upon the insurgency and decreases the overall importance of the central command structure.

In fact, the triumph of the Philippine security service over the Huks resulting in the capture of their command structure in 1950 was at least partially repeated recently. On 29 March 1988, Philippine intelligence operatives engineered the capture of several high ranking CPP cadre, including the chief of the NPA, Romulo Kintanar. But the capture was immediately followed by a statement released by the National Democratic Front that said, "The entire party organization is structured and trained in such a way that, if necessary, it can continue on its own to carry out its tasks should the worst happen to its central leadership."⁴⁰ Given what is already known about NPA decentralization, there is probably a large element of truth to this statement.

In the final analysis, therefore, what is absolutely critical to the survival of the NPA as an effective fighting force, "the hub of all power and movement," as Clausewitz described it, is the bonding at the local level of each separate guerrilla band to the people who live in their base area. All information available seems to indicate that this link is far more important than any link between the local guerrillas and the central command.

Equally as important to the ultimate attainment of strategic objectives is the protection of the friendly center of gravity. At the operational level, the friendly center of gravity can only be the AFP. Because of the same

physical environment that forces decentralization on the NPA, the AFP, in many areas, represents the only real government presence, the only symbol of government authority. If that symbol is flawed by poor relations with the people or inefficiency in the field against the guerrillas, then the counter-insurgency war is lost in that part of the Philippines. As Lansdale discovered, the wedding of the military to the people, becoming their army, is crucial. One of the best ways to illustrate this point is to briefly look at the record of the Philippines' 7,000 man Marine Corps in the counter-insurgency effort against the NPA.

The basis for their success seems to be the discipline and idealism that has been instilled in the force through selective recruiting, high standards, and tough training. Former Marine Corps Commandant Rodolfo Blazon is the epitome of the disciplined soldier who has remained apart from the cycle of military inspired coups against the Aquino government. His Marines have adopted a policy of winning over the Communist power base and an attitude that their first line of defense is the good will of the people in the area. Through a system called pulong-pulong, the Marines carry on dialogue with the local people based on concern for their welfare and respect for their place as citizens. Working at village level, the Marines have destroyed the effectiveness of the NPA everywhere they have operated.⁴¹

The problem, of course, is what happens when the Marines leave and the local militias must secure the area. But the point to be made is that this bonding with the people is the key to success in the Philippines strategic environment. It is the friendly center of gravity. The NPA must attack it, must prevent it, to win in that local area.

Phasing of Operations

Returning to the experience of Edward Lansdale against the Huks, we can see that he recognized this relationship although he never used the term 'center of gravity.' To achieve American goals in the Philippines in the 1950's, Lansdale saw his overall effort divided into phases. He knew that he had to (1) strengthen then Secretary of Defense Ramon Magsaysay so that he could (2) reform and revitalize the Philippine military and thus (3) achieve military victory over the Huks.⁴² In Lansdale's personal priorities may be seen the skeleton of a campaign plan, his phasing of related operations. His goal was, in reality, the strategic objective of the United States government at that time, the object of a highly classified project of major importance to the United States to contain Soviet influence in the Philippines and ultimately in the rest of Asia.⁴³ To accomplish this strategic objective, he devised a plan that was sequenced in at least two distinct phases: first, turn

the Philippine military into an effective counter-insurgency instrument, then, second, to use that instrument to defeat the Huks in the field.

Brought forward to modern times, Lansdale's phases may be applied to our modern operational objectives. Based on what we know of the growing strength of the NPA and the diminishing capability of the AFP to deal with it effectively, the phases of this campaign should probably be broken down as follows:

* Phase I - Preparatory phase - During this phase, strategic PSYOPS will be conducted to prepare the Philippine population for American involvement. The Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) will be established and assume OPCON of assigned forces. Evacuation of unnecessary civilians, primarily dependents, from American bases will be completed.

* Phase II - During this phase, an aggressive foreign internal defense operation will be conducted to train the AFP as an effective counter-insurgency force. A combined intelligence effort will carry on covert operations to infiltrate NPA units and the CPP command structure, and to provide responsive, integrated intelligence to US and Philippine planners. The security assistance program will be fully integrated into the total counter-insurgency

effort. US naval and air forces will assist the Philippines in interdicting all outside aid to the guerrillas.

* Phase III - If deemed necessary, and approved by the CINC, American SOF will begin to participate in active combat operations with their AFP counterparts. This phase must be preceded by Congressional approval and Presidential reporting in accordance with the War Powers Resolution.

* Phase IV - As a last resort, in the event of outside intervention on behalf of the NPA, US conventional forces may be committed. Such a commitment follows the current thinking regarding the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951.

From the Philippine point of view, these phases are important because they define the level of US involvement, but the breaks between phases are not as clearly separated as they are viewed from the American side. This is true because the NPA insurgency dominates their political lives, having been a fact of life in the Philippines since early in the Marcos era. They cannot stop fighting the NPA and return to some artificial starting point.

From the American point of view, however, each of the phases defines operational activity that is closely related, but the break between phases is much more clearly defined. Interestingly enough, the qualitative changes in the level of military activity will not be great. Moving into the

second phase, dominated by the American training effort to revitalize the AFP, military operations will closely resemble the peacetime activity that has already taken place on a yearly basis in the Philippines. It will be far better coordinated but will not look very different at the soldier level. Even moving to the third phase, with direct American SOF involvement, will not represent a great change over the previous period of intensive training in a semi-permissive environment.

But there will be distinct and very significant political differences for Americans between phases. Moving into the second phase will reflect a total change in the American strategic outlook in the Philippines, from a policy of concerned spectator to one of psychological commitment to defeating the NPA, even though American soldiers are not carrying arms. Transitioning to the third phase means crossing the line between the grey world of advice and assistance to that of fighting in combat. It also represents a significant difference in American public commitment and the level of Congressional involvement. While the number of American soldiers should not be allowed to increase over the relatively small level employed during the training phase, their new role will require reporting to Congress under the War Powers Resolution and that will bring a growing awareness in the American public of the reality of the situation. This represents what Harry Summers called a

"formal institution with societal value,."44 It legitimizes our effort to help the Philippino people in the eyes of our own people and announces to all of the world that we are committed to the defeat of the NPA and the preservation of democracy in the Philippines.

Command Relationships

One of the earliest and possibly most crucial decisions to be made is how the campaign will be coordinated and given a single unified direction. If it were a conventional campaign, the CINC might decide to establish a Joint task force and assign it responsibility for a subordinate theater of operations. But in a campaign of this kind that will incorporate each of the military services, several civilian agencies, and take place in a theater of operations that threatens interference with the traditional prerogatives of the Ambassador, the decision must be thought out carefully. But the system of command and control must be established at the beginning and all parties must sign up for it or chaos will be the everyday reality of our effort to fight a coordinated campaign. In all likelihood, a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) will be required to enforce the kind of early organization of command and control that is required to get the campaign off on the right foot.

In coming to grips with the problem, there are some historical antecedents of value, examples of how the same decision was made and implemented in insurgencies of the past. One of the first that comes to mind is the British system of command and control used during the Malayan Emergency between 1948 and 1960. Sir Henry Gurney, appointed as High Commissioner to Malaya in 1948, demonstrated, until his death in a guerrilla ambush in 1951,

a remarkable insight into the problem of revolutionary warfare, the kind being fought in the Philippines today. Early in his tenure, he made the historic decision that under no circumstances could a military man direct the total counter-insurgency war in Malaya. He believed that what was called for was armed support for political war, not political support for an army war. He knew that the Chinese guerrilla leader, Chin Peng, had designed an army largely immune to large scale military power and that the application of such power might contribute to British defeat because "the very size of the army foments political instability because political power inevitably rests with control of the Army."⁴⁵ The New People's Army is not ethnically separate as the Chinese Terrorists were in Malaya but it is nonetheless a force that does not present a large military target, and the AFP has already shown a dangerous tendency toward the end that Gurney foresaw in Malaya.

In our own historical experience in Vietnam, if we look at the early years before the massive conventional buildup, we can find some lessons of value to apply to the command and control question in the Philippines. Robert Komer, the man who directed the advisory effort in Vietnam, described the counter-insurgency effort in those early years as "falling between two stools - it was everybody's business and nobody's."⁴⁶ The same observation is made by military historian Jeffrey Clarke. He describes the

counter-insurgency effort as a large collection of overlapping military and non-military programs carried on by competing offices and agencies depending on cooperation rather than unified direction from the top.⁴⁷ The Pentagon Papers describe a bureaucratic tangle in which a large number of military and civilian agencies operated in Vietnam with each having its own ideas of how the counter-insurgency effort should be pursued, its own communication channels back to Washington, its own administrative structure, and its own network of field agents all reporting conflicting views back to Washington.⁴⁸

All of this offers an interesting contrast with the austere in-country organization directed by Edward Lansdale during the Huk insurgency and shows that unconstrained bureaucracies competing for missions, funds, and influence can grow to uncontrollable proportions. It also establishes several imperatives for organizing command and control for a modern counter-insurgency campaign in the Philippines:

* Overall control in the Philippines should never pass out of the hands of the Ambassador. Another lesson learned that both Komer and Clarke discuss is the schism that eventually developed between military and civilian control in Vietnam, a schism that resulted in the loss of strategic direction. The Ambassador should provide the policy lead in the Philippines that doctrinally belongs to the State

Department in a LIC environment.⁴⁹ He also personally represents the President when matters of national strategy must be resolved to clarify operational problems.

* The actual campaign should be directed by a single commander who reports to the Ambassador until the NCA decides that the conflict has moved to a point on the operational continuum that requires unified direction on a wartime basis. That commander will provide authoritative direction to all military service components and civilian agencies in the Philippines fighting the campaign. Most critical of all, he must have the authority to assign tasks to both military and civilian officers assigned to him by their parent agencies. In military doctrine, this is an OPCON relationship, but civilians must fall under the same control. Possibly the best way to do this is for the CINC to establish a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) that will control not only military but civilian agencies who will direct the campaign in support of the CINC's overall theater strategy.⁵⁰ Unique to a campaign of this sort, CINCPAC will actually play the role of a supporting CINC who is providing forces to a JSOTF controlled by the Ambassador. Once assigned to this JSOTF, all military and civilian agencies should talk to their parent agencies through the JSOTF commander to avoid the chaotic state of affairs that existed in Vietnam because there was no central

In-country authority. The Ambassador must resist the temptation to exempt some of the civilians participating in the campaign from control of the JSOTF or to allow them their own separate reporting chains. The NSDD might be the mechanism to make this point authoritative.

* The JSOTF ensures that command and control is located in the Philippines, not in Hawaii or in Washington. One of the key elements of success against the Huks was the close personal relationship that developed between Ramon Magsaysay as the Philippine Secretary of Defense and Edward Lansdale as the senior American executing the campaign of that day.

* The Philippines must be involved in planning and strategic direction from the very beginning, making the entire effort both Joint and combined. Because of its combined configuration and its past role in resolving combined security issues, the Mutual Defense Board can be the vehicle to provide this combined effort. Over time, the Philippines must be encouraged to develop a system that corresponds at least in intent, if not in form, with the American JSOTF, a United Front of all of their agencies involved in the campaign. Subordinates of the JSOTF should have unencumbered coordinating authority with their counterparts on the Philippine side under the overall supervision of the JSOTF commander.

* The National Training Plan - To lay the ground work for the combined training effort that will follow, Americans and Philipinos must determine training priorities that logically support the counter-insurgency effort and document those priorities in a national training plan. As an example of what should appear in this plan, the Philippine Army should be carefully evaluated to determine what units have problems, which are most suited for critical CI missions, which are assigned to the most hotly contested areas, and what are the lessons learned from the 20 years of counter-insurgency that has already gone on. We find that it is an Army of approximately 68,000 soldiers formed into eight infantry divisions and a scout ranger regiment, among other units. There is a Marine Corps of four brigades, and a peculiarly Philipino organization known as the Philippine Constabulary of 38,000, by law part of the Army but resembling a national police force in character. There is also the largely untried Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU) that replaced the disgraced Civil Home Defense Force.⁵¹

The National Training Plan should address how these units are going to be employed in combat and how the training should be orgalized to best prepare them. Such a plan provides the best possible foundation for later combined planning of Phase II of the campaign. It precludes units being trained because of random availability, much as

they are today in combined exercises in the Philippines between the AFP and American SOF units.

Composition of Forces

As already noted, the JSOTF will have a unique military and civilian composition tailored to the needs of the counter-insurgency campaign in the Philippines. There will probably be a natural tendency for it to grow as unexpected requirements arise, but it is crucial to the efficient conduct of the campaign that it be held to a manageable size and include only those components with operational level tasks to perform in support of the campaign.

* Army Component - Army Special Forces, as already noted, are currently operating in the Philippines carrying out a variety of foreign internal defense tasks in support of the WestCom CG's Expanded Relations Program (ERP). They are area-oriented, language qualified, military trainers who perform the sort of mission called for in this campaign as one of their primary missions, Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Most importantly, Army SF is a force multiplier. A Special Forces battalion, for example, operating from centralized training sites, is fully capable of providing unit training to Philippine units up to at least battalion task force size.

But, SF is not the only Army capability required in this campaign. PSYOPS and Civil Affairs units are vital to the civic action side of the training program, as are engineer and medical units. To provide the ideal task organization of Army units, the Army Component should be organized along the lines of the old Special Action Force (SAF). The SAF was a nation-building task organization of the early 60's grouped around a Special Forces Group. Attached to round out the SAF were PSYOPS, civil affairs, engineer, and medical units. The one that was based on Okinawa in those days was known as SAFASIA.⁵² It provided a means to synchronize the very assets that are required in this campaign.

While SAFASIA was organized around a Special Forces Group in the 60's, the one required for the training phase of this campaign (Phase II) should be organized around a battalion only. This provides the balance of the Group to support the CINC's other theater missions and takes advantage of the SF force multiplication capability. If the CINC transitions the campaign to Phase III, consideration should then be given to deploying the entire Group to the Philippines and rounding out SAFASIA to something like its original configuration.

* Navy Component - This element should be a compact element that leans heavily in the direction of the

"brown-water navy." Those assigned to this component should be skilled military trainers like their Army SF counterparts since their primary mission will be to train the Philippine Coast Guard and Navy in coastal interdiction of outside supply to the guerrillas.

* Air Force Component - Like the first two components, the AF component should be primarily organized in Phase II to provide training to Philippine units in counter-insurgency support missions. Later, in Phase III, Air Force lift and tactical fire support assets may be added.

* Joint US Military Advisory Group Philippines (JUSMAGPHIL) - In practical fact, the role of the JUSMAG has changed significantly from what it was when Edward Lansdale first came to the Philippines and was attached to it. At that time, it was far more involved in the counter-insurgency effort than it is today. In fact, today, the JUSMAG policy is to avoid all public impression of involvement in counter-insurgency. Lansdale described the role of the Chief of the JUSMAG as an advisor to the President of the Philippines and, for a while, Magsaysay actually lived in the JUSMAG compound with Lansdale for protection against Manila-based Huk assassination units while he directed the counter-insurgency war.⁵³ The role of the JUSMAG today, however has evolved to one primarily

logistical in nature. It manages the transfer of military equipment to the government of the Philippines through the security assistance program.

By placing it under the control of the JSOTF commander, it provides the facility to continue the logistical flow of equipment needed to support the counter-insurgency effort but in a manner that is synchronized with the overall campaign.

* CIA Detachment - While there will continue to be a CIA effort in the Philippines as part of the country team, there needs to be a small CIA detachment working under the JSOTF. The relationship is one that has not been closely examined in the past, but it is crucial to the success of a total CI effort in the Philippines. It should follow the lines suggested by former CIA professional Theodore Shackley. He points out that solid command relationship agreements prior to the conflict will facilitate this unnatural relationship between the military and the CIA, but it must be done to ensure unity of effort.⁵⁴ A campaign plan will accomplish this pre-conflict agreement.

* PSYOPS component - The JSOTF commander needs an element assigned from United States Information Service (USIS) who will coordinate all strategic PSYOPS in support of his campaign. This element differs from the PSYOPS element that is task organized as part of the SAF in the

Army component. The SAF PSYOPS effort is primarily tactical in nature, facilitating military operations carried out by other elements of the SAF.

* LNO's to the Philippine Military Academy and the Philippines Staff College - Part of the training effort will be to develop solid curriculums to train Philippine professional officers in the nation-building skills required to carry out effective counter-insurgency and to communicate the American ideal of the non-political, professional military officer who serves and protects his democratically elected government.

Operational Direction, Tasking, And Synchronization

Tasking to the elements of the JSOTF should be broad in nature, cognizant of the intensely political environment of counter-insurgency, and specific to the phase in which it occurs. Based on our study of the requirements of this particular campaign, the following general taskings take us through Phase II, the training phase:

* SAFASIA:

1. Train the AFP to be an "Army of the People."

This is a phrase normally employed by our enemies, but it aptly describes what the AFP must become if it is going to carry on counter-insurgency that can defeat the NPA. The

Army must develop a paternalistic attitude toward the people and can use their own Philippine Marines, who have employed this technique very effectively, as an example. Their system of pulong-pulong, applied country-wide, will bring the Army more influence over the population than anything else attempted since Magway personally roamed the countryside talking to the people in their villages. The people in the barangays must see their Army as protectors, not as bullies. While other military skills are being taught to Philippine units by their American counterparts, every opportunity to communicate these ideals must be taken. The AFP must have the capability to clear an area of guerrillas through effective small unit operations, then turn that area over to the CAFGU's who will then continue to secure it, without lapsing into the old habits of the CHDF units who were more of a threat to their people than the NPA.

2. Develop a truly national AFP. Individual units must be trained because of their place in the counter-insurgency campaign, not because they are dominated by a prominent ethnic group. During the Marcos era, for example, many of the promotions went to officers of his home province of Ilocos Norte, in order to increase his personal power base in the AFP. Ethnic, social, and religious groups that are left out provide the kernel of discontent that

Involves soldiers in coups as many of them are today. The Reform the Army Movement (RAM) was formed, according to its proponents, to eradicate such cases of favoritism and nepotism in the AFP, and RAM today is the dominant force in the anti-government coups that have rocked the Aquino administration since 1986. A nationally based AFP based on merit and professionalism will eliminate much of the justification for this political activity.

3. Train the Army in effective small unit operations skills and make it capable of operating professionally at the battalion level. A possible model is the Balikatan exercise conducted by the 1st Battalion of the 1st Special Forces Group in the summer of 1987. During that time, one Special Forces company trained a reinforced AFP battalion, providing concurrent training to soldiers in patrolling and weapons skills, to NCO's and Junior officers in organizing small unit operations, and to the senior commanders in command and staff skills. That battalion was deployed to Mindanao against the NPA and achieved more success than had any other AFP unit in the past several years. Utilizing a centralized training site like the PATC at Ft. Magsaysay, a Special Forces battalion could rotate brigade size units through refresher training of this kind every four to six weeks.

During the Huk Insurgency, the AFP developed a battalion combat team (BCT) concept that proved extremely effective against the Huks. The BCT's were task organized for the local conditions and were trained to go after the Huks rather than waiting for them. They were given regional responsibilities and allowed to develop local intelligence networks that encouraged the people to report guerrilla activity.⁵⁵ These are excellent models for today's requirements.

4. Develop an effective civic action capability to go along with small unit operations skills. An AFP unit that can build schools, bridges, irrigation systems, dig wells, and provide preventive medicine care to the local people is fully capable of defeating the NPA in the contest for influence. The AFP has emphasized civic action since the days of Magsaysay who saw it as a weapon as effective as any combat skill. What is lacking today is not the basic idea but many of the essential engineering and medical skills required to do it effectively. US training must restore as many of these skills as possible.

5. Help the AFP develop and operate effective small unit leadership schools at the NCO and Junior officer level. Special Forces units have started NCO Academics, Officer Candidate programs, and Ranger schools throughout the Third World and many of these programs today form the

nucleus of the leadership training offered by those nations to their soldiers. Using the facilities at the PATC, Ft. Bonifacio, and possibly in areas that have heretofore seen no Americans, like Mindanao, SAFASIA should begin such programs and train Philippine cadres to operate them on a steady state basis. Training of this nature is probably the quickest way to export badly needed small unit leadership skills out to the largest part of the AFP in the shortest possible time.

* Navy Component:

1. Train the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard in the conduct of coastal interdiction operations. The Philippine Coast Guard has approximately 65 patrol craft, hardly adequate to patrol the huge water area of the Philippines archipelago, but perhaps adequate to cover high use infiltration routes once focused by good intelligence.⁵⁶

2. Train the Philippine Navy to support battalion landing team amphibious operations. While the Marines themselves should be matched up with US Army Special Forces, the Philippine navy needs to hone the skills required to conduct quick reaction amphibious operations throughout the archipelago. A good model for this training program is the exportable packages taught by the USMC's two Landing Force

Training Commands. They are designed to train battalion level planners in all areas of amphibious operations.

* Air Force Component:

1. Train the Philippine Air Force to conduct quick reaction lift of combat forces. The Philippine Air Force dedicated to airlift is a mixed force ranging from C-130's to a variety of aircraft from other nations. Much of the Philippine capability to conduct tactical airlift has atrophied over the past twenty years and AFP units in various parts of the Philippines are seldom lifted to other parts of the country in response to a surge in NPA activity in that area. The AFP does not have any real capability to conduct airborne operations, for example, a valuable skill in a counter-insurgency environment. Many AFP officers have admitted to American friends that the only time that they have the opportunity to conduct parachute operations is when American aircraft accompany US Special Forces units on exercises.

2. Train the Philippine Air Force to conduct helicopter air assault operations. Troop lift helicopters are in the Philippine Air Force rather than the Army and are American UH-1's for the most part.⁵⁷ Little or no training in air assault operations takes place today, and the ground

to air coordination procedures between Air Force and Army units in counter-insurgency operations is poor.

* CIA Detachment:

Intelligence is critical to all forms of military operations but it shares a unique relationship with special operations, one that is symbiotic in nature. In a counter-insurgency environment, a fully developed intelligence capability spells the difference between success and failure. However, numerous examples can be cited of failure to integrate ongoing intelligence activities with special operations being conducted in the same theater of operations. Roger Pezzelle, a former practitioner of both activities in Vietnam, offers the example of MACV-SOG (Studies and Observation Group), a Special Forces activity in Vietnam and one of MACV's primary strategic intelligence sources, and the CIA in Vietnam being totally divorced at the theater level. He attributes the problem to the reliance of the two organizations on their own established systems of command relationships.⁵⁸ In planning the campaign in the Philippines, synchronization of the in-country US intelligence effort with counter-insurgency operations by Joint SOF will significantly enhance the output of both. The CIA Detachment's tasks should look like the following:

1. Develop an intelligence gathering capability that can focus on operational level collection targets. The capability to gather tactical intelligence in the field is a skill that can be imparted to Philippine officers by Special Forces training programs. The CIA officer working under the JSOTF is concerned instead with targets of operational level value:

* NPA Command and Control - The greatly decentralized nature of the CPP/NPA movement forced on it by the physical environment of the Philippines puts a tremendous burden on the NPA's central system of strategic direction. This critical node in their command system is a vitally important intelligence target. During the Huk movement, the capture of the Huk Secretariat in Manila was an intelligence triumph for Magsaysay and a blow from which the Huks never recovered. In a recent interview, senior CPP cadre, Satur Ocampo, expressed some concern about the tendency of local guerrilla units to make their own arrangements with local politicians, something he ascribes to loose central control.⁵⁹ The decapitation of the central leadership will leave the local units to their own devices without strategic direction, and this will eventually result in the disintegration of the NPA as a national threat.

* NPA's external source of supply - Although the NPA denies receiving outside support, insisting that all

support comes from within, there is significant evidence that they are seeking or have received heavy weapons from North Korea.⁶⁰ Because the Philippines shares no borders with countries in sympathy with the NPA, infiltration from outside is a tremendous logistical problem for them. Accurate information on arms shipments would allow a synchronized use of naval and air assets to interdict or for the national police to intercept at the ports of debarkation.

* NPA urban underground activities - The Alec Boncayo Brigade, already noted, typifies this type of target. Through the use of high impact assassinations, the ABB provides the NPA with the means to achieve strategic goals, making it an operational target for JSOTF intelligence assets of the highest priority.

2. Develop an effective covert operations capability.
The practice of infiltrating guerrilla ranks with agents posing as guerrillas is not a new one in the Philippines. It was employed by the Philippine Military Intelligence Service (MIS) against the Hukb with outstanding success in the early 1950's and has been used against the NPA. The capture of the CPP/NPA cadres in 1988 is a good example. During the Huk Insurgency, it worked so well that there were cases of the government infiltrator rising to high rank in the guerrilla unit.⁶¹

Few operations can be as devastating to a guerrilla organization as a successful penetration. In writing in prison after his capture, American radical, William Pomeroy described the final days of the Huk as a time of constant retreat, exhaustion, and absolutely no chance to regain the initiative.⁶² The loss of the clandestinity, of facelessness, of security destroyed the Huk ability to strike at places of their own choosing. As desirable an objective as this is, it is only half of the solution if there is no means to follow up the information. Coordination between intelligence assets and government security forces, planned for in the campaign plan, ensures a combat capability to follow up such information when the time is right. It also precludes the AFP from unknowingly destroying an effective intelligence operation out of ignorance of its existence. In the heyday of CIA covert operations, all new Agency officers were required to read an obscure book entitled Gangs and Countergangs by Frank Kitson, a British special operations officer. In it, he explained how a national level plan to infiltrate a virulent insurgency in Kenya known as the Mau Mau had met with total success. This system has proven effective in insurgencies all over the world since the end of World War II wherever it was applied in a systematic and coordinated manner, or, put another way, as a component of a national level campaign plan.

3. Develop a link between US intelligence and the unfinished, grass roots intelligence that can be gathered by US Army SOF who are in constant touch with Philippine soldiers. On a far less formal basis than our national intelligence means at work in the Philippines, there is also a large source of raw information that originates in the day to day contacts between American SOF and their Philippine counterparts. In the past, this has ranged from low level "soldier talk" to some rather sophisticated efforts to establish usable data bases on the NPA.

A 1983 special operations symposium sponsored by the National Defense University identified two principal problems that prevent all of the available information being used to advantage in the Philippines. First, excessive compartmentation between the military and civilian side causes information to be ignored and, second, there is a tendency for intelligence professionals to consider information gathered by special operations forces as suspect and unreliable. One example of this latter problem is the case of the Tet offensive in 1968 when American Special Forces and their indigenous counterparts reported large scale enemy movements to the southward in January of 1968. The information was not thought to be reliable and the enemy achieved strategic surprise. Former CIA officer, Theodore Shackley, participating in the symposium, suggested the cure to be the subordination of CIA assets to the military in

counter-insurgency.⁶³ Subordinating both the military component and the CIA to the JSOTF on an equal level probably offers the most palatable way for all concerned to achieve the synchronization required without raking up old political rivalries.

* JUSMAGPHIL:

1. Integrate security assistance with the total counter-insurgency campaign. In the pre-conflict situation that exists today in the Philippines, security assistance has had some solid results on the local, "tactical" level but has never been integrated with other instruments according to any sort of operational level vision. Proven American infantry and artillery weapons, along with a limited number of helicopters, have enhanced the AFP's material effectiveness. However, the training to go with these weapons as well as their integration into a solid, small unit, counter-insurgency capability has not been near as effective, as has already been noted earlier in the study. The disconnect arises because the Philippines are focused on the NPA threat while current American policy does not recognize an American role in the CI effort.

This needed integration is one of the key areas where the synchronizing function of the campaign plan makes a real difference in AFP combat capability. Providing equipment without the training on how to use it is providing half of a capability. Neither the SA Organization in the American Country Team nor the officers of JUSMAGPHIL who are primarily logisticians have the means to provide the training. On the other hand, if the SA program is integrated through a campaign plan with the JSOTF's Special Forces assets who are skilled military trainers, and both employed to meet the same operational objectives, the AFP

capability to defeat the NPA can be significantly enhanced. Special Forces units of the 1st Special Forces Group can provide the missing mortar gunnery training and help the AFP commanders better organize for combat. They can also quickly identify crippling deficiencies in the AFP, the poor weapons maintenance, for example, that is largely invisible to the Manila-based SAO. Their long exposure to the soldiers of the AFP during combined training enables them to provide the information to the SAO that allows the security assistance program to be fine tuned to actual needs. American SOF should not learn about US security assistance programs by stumbling over them during the course of combined training exercises, as often happens now, but should be part of an integrated effort from the very beginning to provide the training that goes with the equipment.

One of the key advantages of a campaign plan in this case is that one would help the CINC to exercise his statutory responsibility to ensure that all security assistance programs are integrated with regional defense plans. He can facilitate the process by initiating coordination between the Assistant Secretary Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and his assistant, the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSSA). Because the final form of security

assistance plans can be politically sensitive, the CINC must surface coordination difficulties at this level and by doing so, he can ensure the success of the theater of operations campaign plan that is subordinate to his theater of war campaign plan. He should also ensure that in-theater SOF are used for all security assistance activities with CI potential. SOF should conduct MTT surveys, participate in SA planning conferences at theater level, and provide the personnel for all MTT's for which they have the qualified personnel.

2. Use the security assistance program to rebuild the infrastructure at the Philippine Army Training Center (PATC) at Ft. Maguway. Today, a walk through the PATC, the principal AFP training facility, reminds the observer of pictures of blasted German cities during World War II. A succession of typhoons destroyed many of the buildings at the PATC but the funds were not available to repair them. Many of them are used for training and living areas despite missing roofs and no windows. While it is a tribute to the Philippine soldier that he can endure such living conditions, it is not difficult to understand why Philippine officers, surrounded on a daily basis by the physical evidence of the apathy of their government, become involved in coups. Better living and training conditions would be a visible commitment on the part of the Philippine government

to support its military and might help begin the process of returning the Philippine Army to the business of armies. Beyond the psychological benefit, the quality of combined training would be drastically improved.

* PSYOPS Component: Conduct strategic PSYOPS in support of the counter-insurgency campaign.

In fighting the Huks in the early 1950's, Edward Lansdale discovered that one of his most potent weapons was PSYOPS. Over the course of the counter-insurgency campaign of that day, he enjoyed one PSYOPS success after another. Lansdale believed that aside from bare hands, it was perhaps man's oldest weapon. He said, "the important thing to remember is that it is a weapon . . . it is used to make people do something." His precept was that the more clearly you know what you want your enemy to do, the more effective will be your use of this weapon. Be fuzzy about this and your results will be fuzzy.⁶⁴

One of the difficulties that immediately arises when attempting to fuse PSYOPS with other components of the campaign is that there seems to be little distinction between strategic and operational objectives. A PSYOPS effort with its broad, sweeping objectives may flow back and forth across the boundaries between levels of strategy with little regard for the operational objectives of the theater of operations commander. A broad, strategic theme that

encourages the Philippine people to embrace democratic reforms could have unintended effects at the level of the operational commander who is carrying on a counter-insurgency campaign. On the other end of the scale, actions on the part of a tactical commander in a sensitive area of the country could have ramifications that reach to the strategic level. In his speech to the Special Warfare Center at Ft. Bragg in 1964, old Huk fighter Napoleon Valeriano described how abuses by men in uniform, their habit of living off of the people when their logistics broke down, induced many citizens in Huklandia to support the Huks rather than the men in uniform representing the government.⁶⁵ We can certainly identify many instances of this phenomenon in our own Vietnam experience.

Indirectly, Valeriano identifies another reason why it is important that PSYOPS be incorporated fully into the campaign. In his historical example, poor logistics induced behavior in the field with profound psycho-social implications just as other components of the campaign might flow over into the PSYOPS area. It is critical, therefore, that PSYOPS occupy a place in the campaign planning architecture that allows its synchronization with other weapon systems.

Returning to Lansdale's advice to know what we want the enemy to do, who are the target groups and what should be the specific kinds of behavior that are desired to support

operational level objectives? One possible way to draw a usable line between the strategic and the operational in the PSYOPS effort is to consider the people of the Philippines, the general population, to be a strategic target, while the AFP and the NPA are target groups at the operational level. Because it is difficult to separate target groups in PSYOPS, there clearly must be a great deal of coordination between the two echelons to ensure unity of effort. The strategic effort, as in every other part of the world, will be in the province of the United States Information Agency (USIS) and the USIS representative on the Country Team should direct this effort for the USIS. The JSOTF PSYOPS staff officer, perhaps a USIS officer himself assigned to the JSOTF, must keep the JSOTF commander in constant touch with the strategic PSYOPS picture. His relationship to the USIS representative must be one of close cooperation, a staff relationship, to ensure the coordination of PSYOPS themes, but his command link must be to the task force commander to avoid the evils identified by Robert Komer when he described the CI effort in Vietnam.

Themes must be carefully selected to support campaign objectives but should include the following general ideas:

**** The AFP must be an "Army of the People."**

**** AFP involvement in coups is destructive to the health of the AFP and allows the NPA to make gains while the**

AFP is caught up in political maneuvering against their own government.

** The US is a helper and a friend, but very much in the background. Successes are Philippine successes, not American successes.

** The US and the Philippines have a rich history of friendship and cooperation against a common enemy

** The insurgency is futile - it will fall because it is incompatible with the natural democratic tendencies of the Philippine people.

** Land reform takes a long time to implement but it will happen.

** The Philippine people have nothing to fear from the presence of US bases. They are no threat to sovereignty.

* JSOTF LNO's to Philippines Military Academy and the Philippines Staff College:

1. Assist the Commandant of the PMA to develop a curriculum that supports the growth of a professionally oriented officer corps. The PMA has, to a certain extent, encouraged the radicalization of a generation of AFP officers. Much of the curriculum was developed during the

Marcos era and reflected his authoritarian approaches to government and his warped view of civil-military relations. American efforts today in El Salvador offer a model of what might be accomplished in the Philippines in support of a broader effort to rid the nation of the insurgent threat. American West Point graduates have been assigned to the El Salvadorean military academy to help in the development of a curriculum based on the West Point curriculum. The PMA must be put on the basis of a Philippino West Point, an institution that educates professionally competent officers who are responsive to their democratically elected government and who believe their duty to be to protect their people.

2. Assist the Commandant of the Philippines Staff College to develop a curriculum that provides solid, professional mid-level command and staff skills to Philippino officers. One of the glaring weaknesses of the Philippino officer corps is in basic command and staff skills on the level that are taught to American officers at Ft. Leavenworth during Command and Staff College. The curriculum should be based on the counter-insurgency war that is being fought today in the Philippines and should borrow liberally from the American Army's Special Warfare Center. Education at this level while there is an insurgency being fought in the country provides one of the

most efficient ways to provide doctrinal instruction along
with lessons learned from various parts of the Philippines.

CHAPTER III - SOME FINAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CAMPAIGN PLAN

A well integrated campaign plan will lay the groundwork for a smooth transition from Phase II, the training phase, to Phase III, in which American counter-insurgency forces are themselves directly involved in the conflict. Phase III recognizes that American forces may have to go into the conflict against the NPA to attain the operational commander's theater strategic objectives, but if that does become necessary, the campaign plan will insure that all American forces are synchronized with one another and under the direction of a well established command structure. The campaign plan will also assure that the conflict in the Philippines will be fought as an integral part of the Combatant Commander's overall strategy for the theater of war which in turn will ensure that recognized strategic objectives remain the guiding spirit of American involvement and the definition of its final success. The requirement for NCA and Congressional involvement in the transition from Phase II to Phase III ensures public recognition and approval of the American role in the conflict.

A campaign plan also facilitates the CINC's responsibility under joint doctrine to organize in peacetime for the purpose of effecting an orderly, rapid transition from a peacetime posture to wartime conditions.⁶⁶ The conceptual difficulty that we have already seen is that the doctrinal definition of LIC, in which counter-insurgency has been included, does not provide a good basis for identifying

the point at which the transition to war takes place. But a good campaign plan will smooth over much of that difficulty by allowing the CINC and his subordinate JSOTF commander to transition from the grey area of advice and training to the much plainer reality of US involvement in combat operations in a rapid and orderly manner, however differing perceptions might eventually place that on the operational continuum.

To really put this campaign plan into perspective, however, we must recognize that it applies to a commitment of American forces in a way that the United States may not yet be willing to accept. It only answers the question of how the US might help its old friend, the Philippines, given the real possibility that strategic perceptions in Asia may change as American perceptions of the global Soviet threat change. It recognizes a possible contingency in an area where the United States has long held strategic interests. For that reason, this campaign plan forms the foundation for a Concept Plan for possible future US-assisted counter-insurgency in the Philippines, rather than a fully developed Operations Plan.

Just as it provides a rational basis for planning for future conflict in the Philippines, it might help to rationalize the current US efforts in this Pacific nation and suggests a way in which they might be used more effectively and more efficiently than they are today. There is a significant American SOF presence in the Philippines

through the CINC's exercise program and there is a large security assistance effort there, but they are, in fact, very poorly coordinated. There are different sources of intelligence that are not integrated in any way. There is absolutely no common command and control. There is a general lack of understanding of the tremendous capability represented by in-theater SOF forces in situations far short of actual conflict. Not only do they have the capability to provide professional military training but they have a very strong capability to perform disaster relief missions and humanitarian assistance.

Whether or not current American national security policy requires the immediate implementation of this CONPLAN, it will serve the crucial purpose of helping the CINC prepare today for a war that could quickly come. Many of the key elements of Phase II of this plan could be, indeed should be, implemented today. American SOF activities should be integrated with ongoing security assistance activities. All security assistance activities should employ SOF who will operate in the Philippines under this campaign plan so that their area orientation to the theater and language capability are increased. Along the same lines, SOF should be used as often as possible in activities like disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Every deployment of this kind increases SOF capability to transition to the conflict envisioned in this campaign plan.

Certainly, all intelligence sources from national level CIA activities down to the gathering of raw information by American SOF during exercises should be integrated into a single data base that will support this campaign plan.

Along the same lines, the Balikatan and Badge Pack series of exercises should be configured to enhance the capability of the AFP to fight the counter-insurgency war against the NPA, not to provide conventional American units the opportunity to conduct unilateral training in an exotic training area. These exercises provide the CINC another opportunity to prepare for possible implementation of his campaign plan for the Philippines by exercising some of the Phase II tasks without actually participating in the counter-insurgency war. The battalion combat team training program conducted by the 1st Special Forces Group in Balikatan 1987 is an outstanding model for a pre-conflict exercise of this campaign plan. The 1st Group was task organized for this exercise with engineer and medical units along the lines of the old SAFASIA concept and it worked remarkably well.

Clearly, this campaign plan provides for a much more common-sense approach to the use across the entire operational continuum of in-theater SOF, intelligence, and security assistance. It identifies forces, primarily SOF, that should be dedicated to this plan and allows them to take advantage of their unique ability to operate in the

grey areas on the fringes of conflict and maintain an almost constant pre-conflict presence in the Philippines.

Logically, these forces should not be written into other general war plans that require them to train, equip, and prepare for a wartime mission that is totally separate from that which they perform on the lower end of the continuum. Thus, a campaign plan for a LIC theater of operations in the Philippines provides a rational basis for the supporting CINC, USSOCOM, the services, and the appropriate civilian agencies, to train and equip their forces for war.

Finally, by viewing a counter-insurgency effort in which the US might become more involved at the level of operational art and applying the tenets of campaign planning to it, we are able to dispel some of the doctrinal shadows that obscure Low Intensity Conflict. There is no historical inevitability that anti-democratic insurgents will win as they did in Vietnam so long as we understand the strategic environment, focus on the objective, lead professionally, and make our assets work in consonance with one another. Because the probability of LIC involvement, on the model of a counter-insurgency war in the Philippines, will only increase as the Soviet threat recedes, we must make our doctrine work for us in this crucial area.

NOTES

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Publication 5-0. Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Undated): II-19.

²Ibid, III-32.

³Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Publication 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Washington, DC: January 1990): xxv.

⁴Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Publication 3-07. Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: January 1990): VI-3, VI-4.

⁵David A. Rosenberg, "The Philippines: Aquino's First Year," Current History, Vol 86, No 519 (April 1987): 162-163.

⁶James Clad, "Betting on Violence," Far Eastern Economic Review (17 December 1987): 35.

⁷Carl H. Lande and Richard Hooley, "Aquino Takes Charge," Foreign Affairs, Vol 64, No 5 (Summer 1986): 1097.

⁸Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 371-375.

⁹James Clad, "Betting on Violence," 35.

¹⁰James Clad, "Anatomy of a Red Revolution," Far Eastern Economic Review (28 July 1988): 12.

¹¹John McBeth, "Long Struggle Ahead," Far Eastern Economic Review (27 April 1989): 20-21.

¹²James Clad, "Betting on Violence," 36; Clad, "Anatomy of a Red Revolution," 12.

¹³Margot Cohen, "Lesson in Blood," Far Eastern Economic Review (1 June 1989): 32; John McBeth, "Deadly Sparrows," Far Eastern Economic Review (4 May 1989): 22.

¹⁴James Clad, "War in the Streets," Far Eastern Economic Review (26 November 1987): 24.

¹⁵John McBeth, "Critical Solidarity," Far Eastern Economic Review (1 June 1989): 30-31.

- ¹⁶Lande and Hooley, "Aquino Takes Charge," 1099.
- ¹⁷Rosenburg, "The Philippines: Aquino's First Year," 162.
- ¹⁸International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1989-1990 (London: IISS, 1989): 173.
- ¹⁹Ibid, 173.
- ²⁰James Clad, "Military Malcontents," Far Eastern Economic Review (10 September 1987): 18-19.
- ²¹Rosenburg, "The Philippines: Aquino's First Year," 185.
- ²²John McBeth, "Division of Loyalties," Far Eastern Economic Review (28 December 1989): 19.
- ²³John McBeth, "Time for Toughness," Far Eastern Economic Review (21 December 1989): 12.
- ²⁴John McBeth, "Gunning for Cory," Far Eastern Economic Review (14 December 1989): 14.
- ²⁵James Clad, "Losing the Palace War," Far Eastern Economic Review (4 February 1988): 12.
- ²⁶Gabriel Marcella, "Security Assistance Revisited: How to Win Friends and Not Lose Influence," Parameters Vol XII, No 4 (December 1982): 51.
- ²⁷IISS, The Military Balance 1989-1990, 172.
- ²⁸Claude A. Buss, The United States and the Philippines: Background for Policy (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977): 122.
- ²⁹Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January, 1988): 31.
- ³⁰Department of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress: Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989): 54.
- ³¹William W. Mendel and Floyd T. Banks, Campaign Planning (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1988): 100-102.

³²JCS Pub 3-07, VI-7.

³³Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1972): p. ix.

³⁴Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976): 595-596.

³⁵David J. Steinburg, The Philippines: A Singular and Plural Place (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1982): 96.

³⁶Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars, 85.

³⁷William J. Pomeroy, "The Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines," in Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, edited by Gerard Chaland (Berkeley, Ca: University of California Press, 1982): 96-106.

³⁸Napolean D. Valeriano. Speech delivered at the Special Warfare Center, Ft. Bragg, NC, 2 October 1964. In A Summary of the US Role in Insurgency Situations in the Philippine Islands, 1899-1955 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Research and Development, 1964): 1-2.

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⁴⁰James Clad, "Capturing the Cadres," Far Eastern Economic Review (14 April 1988): 12-13.

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⁴²Cecil B. Curry, Edward Lansdale: The Ungulet American (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988): 93-94.

⁴³Ibid, p. 79.

⁴⁴Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, 1981): 11.

⁴⁵Noel Barber, The War of the Running Dogs: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960 (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1971): 62-63.

⁴⁶Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam

(Santa Monica, Ca: The Rand Corporation, 1972): 76.

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